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Abstract In this paper we consider the problem of the existence and deter-
mining stationary Nash equilibria for switching controller stochastic games
with discounted and average payos. The set of states and the set of actions
in the considered games are assumed to be nite. For a switching controller
stochastic game with discounted payos we show that all stationary equilib-
ria can be found by using an auxiliary continuous noncooperative static game
in normal form in which the payos are quasi-monotonic (quasi-convex and
quasi-concave) with respect to the corresponding strategies of the players.
Based on this we propose an approach for determining the optimal stationary
strategies of the players. In the case of average payos for a switching con-
troller stochastic game we also formulate an auxiliary noncooperative static
game in normal form with quasi-monotonic payos and show that such a
game possesses a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding switching controller
stochastic game has a stationary Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Stochastic game, Switching control, Stationary strategies, Sta-
tionary Nash equilibrium
1. Introduction
A switching controller stochastic game is a stochastic game in which the transi-
tion probabilities in a state are controlled only by one of the players. So, the set of
states of anm-player switching controller stochastic game can be divided intom dis-
joint subsets where each subset represents the set of states for one of the player that
governs the transition probabilities. The problem of determining stationary Nash
equilibria in switching controller stochastic games recently has been studied by
Bayraktar et al., 2016; Dubey et al., 2017; Krishnamurthy, N., Neogy, S.K., 2020.
For a switching controller stochastic game with discounted payos stationary equi-
libria exist because stationary Nash equilibria exist for a discounted stochastic
game in general. Schultz, 1992 showed that the optimal stationary strategies of
the players in a discounted switching controller stochastic game can be found by
solving an auxiliary linear complimentary problem. In the case of switching con-
trol stochastic games with average payos stationary Nash equilibria are known
to exist only for some special classes of games, however, for such an arbitrary
game Thuijman and Raghavan, 1997 showed the existence of ϵ- Nash equilibria.
In general, the question of the existence of stationary Nash equilibria for an average
stochastic game is an open problem.
In this paper we propose some new results concerned with determining stationary
Nash equilibria in switching controller stochastic games with discounted and average
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payos. We show that all stationary equilibria for a discounted switching controller
stochastic game can be obtained as Nash equilibria for an auxiliary noncoopera-
tive continuous static game in normal form where the payos are quasi-monotonic
(quasi-convex and quasi-concave) with respect to the corresponding strategies of
the players. Based on this we propose an approach for determining the optimal
stationary strategies of the players for a discounted switching controller stochastic
game. For an average switching controller stochastic game we also formulate an aux-
iliary noncooperative static game with quasi-monotonic payos and show that such
a game has a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding average switching controller
stochastic game has a stationary Nash equilibrium.
2. Formulation of the Basic Game Models
An m-player switching controller stochastic game consists of the following ele-
ments:
- a nite set of states X;
- a nite set of actions Ai(x) in each state x ∈ X for an arbitrary player
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m};
- a reward rix,a for each player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} in each state x ∈ X for an
arbitrary action vector a = (a1, a2 . . . , am), where ai ∈ Ai(x), i = 1, 2 . . . ,m;
- a partition X = X1∪X2∪· · ·∪Xm, of the set of states X, where Xi represents
the set of controllable states of player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m};
- a transition probability function pi : Xi ×
∏
x∈Xi A
i(x)×X → [0, 1] for each
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} that gives the transition probabilities paix,y of player i
from an arbitrary x ∈ Xi and each ai ∈ Ai(x) to an arbitrary y ∈ X where∑
y∈X p
ai
x,y = 1,∀x ∈ Xi,∀ai ∈ Ai(x);
- a starting state x0 ∈ X.
The game starts in the state x0 at the moment of time t = 0 where the players
simultaneously and independently x their actions ai0 ∈ Ai(x0), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
After that the players receive the corresponding rewards rix0,a0 , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m in x0




0, . . . , a
m
0 ). Then the game passes randomly to
a state x1 ∈ X according to the probability distribution {p
a10
x0,y}y∈X . At the moment
of time t = 1 players observe the state x1 ∈ X and again simultaneously and
independently select their actions ai1 ∈ Ai(x1), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m in the state x1 and





1, . . . , a
m
1 ). Then the game passes randomly to a state x2 ∈ X according
to a probability distribution {pa
1
1
x1,y}y∈X . In general, at the moment of time t the
players observe the state xt ∈ X, x their actions ait ∈ Ai(xt), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m in
xt and receive the corresponding rewards r
i
x1,at , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m in xt for the given




t , . . . , a
m
t ). Such a play of the game produces a sequence of
states and actions x0, a0, x1, a1, . . . , xt, at, . . . that denes a stream of stage rewards
r1xt,at , r
2
xt,at , . . . , r
m
xt,at , t = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
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, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
where E is the expectation operator with respect to the probability measure induced
by the Markov process with actions chosen by the rst player and given starting
state x0. Each player in this game has the aim to maximize his average reward per
transition.
The discounted switching-controller stochastic game with a given discount factor







Each player in this game has the aim to maximize his discounted sum of stage
rewards.
We will study these games in the case when the players use stationary strategies
of selection the actions in the states.
3. Switching Controller Stochastic Games in Stationary Strategies
A strategy si(xt) of player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} in a switching controller stochastic
game is a mapping si that provides for every state xt ∈ X a probability distribution
over the set of actions Ai(xt). If these probabilities take only values 0 and 1, then s
i
is called a pure strategy, otherwise si is called a mixed strategy. If these probabilities
depend only of the state xt = x ∈ X (i.e. si do not depend on t), then si is called
a stationary strategy, otherwise si is called a non-stationary strategy.
Thus, we can identify the set of stationary strategies Si of player i with the set
of solutions of the following system
∑
ai∈A(x)
six,ai = 1, ∀x ∈ X;
six,ai ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A(x)
in which the basic solutions corresponds to the set of pure stationary strategies.
Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sm be a prole of stationary
strategies (pure or mixed strategies) of the players. Taking into account that the
transition probabilities in each state are controlled only by one of the players, we
have that the dynamics of the game is determined by the stochastic matrix P s =
(psx,y), where the elements p
s






x,y, for x ∈ Xi and y ∈ X, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (1)
If Qs = (qsx,y) is the limiting probability matrix of P
s then the average payos per
transition ω1x0(s), ω
2
x0(s), . . . , ω
m






y,s, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (2)










expresses the average payo (immediate reward) in the state y ∈ X of player i
when the corresponding stationary strategies s1, s2, . . . , sm have been applied by




The functions ω1x0(s), ω
2
x0(s), . . . , ω
m
x0(s) on S = S
1 × S2 × · · · × Sm,
dened according to (2), (3), determine a game in normal form that we denote by
⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωix0(s)}i=1,m ⟩. This game corresponds to the average switching con-
troller stochastic game in stationary strategies that in extended form is determined
by the tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}x∈X,i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, {pi}i=1,m, x0).
A discounted switching controller stochastic game in stationary strategies with
given discount factor γ we dene as follows. Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) be a prole of
stationary strategies (pure or mixed strategies) of the players. Then the elements
of the probability transition matrix P s = (psx,y) induced by s can be calculated
according to (1) and we can nd the matrixW s = (wsx,y), whereW
s = (I−γP s)−1.






y,s, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where riy,s is calculated according to (3). These payos on S dene a normal form
game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {σix0(s)}i=1,m ⟩ that corresponds to the discounted switching con-
troller stochastic game in stationary strategies. In the extended form this game is
determined by tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}x∈X,i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, {pi}i=1,m, γ, x0).
In this paper we will consider also an average switching controller stochastic
game in which the starting state is chosen randomly according to a given distribution
θ = {θx} on X. So, for a game we will assume that the play starts in the state
x ∈ X with probability θx > 0 where
∑
x∈X
θx = 1. If the players use stationary






x(s), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
on S dene a game in normal form ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ that in the extended
form is determined by the tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}x∈X,i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, p, θ).
In the case θx = 0,∀x ∈ X \{x0}, θxo = 1 the considered game becomes an average
switching controller stochastic game with a xed starting state x0.
Similarly, for a discounted switching controller stochastic game we can consider
the case when the starting state is chosen randomly according to a given distribution






x(s), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
on S and we obtain the game in normal form ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {σiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ that is
determined by the tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}x∈X,i=1,m, {f i(x, a}i=1,m, p, γ, θ).
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Note that an average switching controller stochastic game in the case m =
1 becomes an average Markov decision problem that is determined by the tuple
(X, {A(x)}x∈X , {rx,a}, p, θ), where X = X1, A(x) = A1(x), rx,a = r1x,a and
a = a1 ∈ A(x) for x ∈ X. Similarly, a discounted switching controller stochastic
game in the case m = 1 becomes a discounted Markov decision problem that is
determined by the tuple (X, {A(x)}x∈X , {rx,a}, p, γ, θ).
4. Preliminaries
In this section we present some properties of Markov decision problems with
average and expected total discounted reward optimization criteria that we shall
use in the following two sections for studying the switching controller stochastic
games.
Let us consider a discounted Markov decision problem that is determined by the
tuple (X, {A(x)}x∈X , {rx,a}, p, γ, θ). Lozovanu and Pickl, 2018 showed that this
decision problem can be formulated and studied in terms of stationary strategies
because the expected total discounted reward σθ(s) for a given stationary strat-
egy s when the starting state y ∈ X is chosen randomly according to probability













sx,aqx = θy,∀y ∈ X.
Furthermore, the following theorem has been proven.














sx,aqx = θy,∀y ∈ X.
Then on the set S of the solutions of the system
∑
a∈A(x)
sx,a = 1, ∀x ∈ X;
sx,a ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A(x).
the function σθ(s) depends only on sx,a for x ∈ X, a ∈ A(x) and σθ(s)
is quasi-monotonic on S, i.e. σθ(s) is quasi-convex and quasi-concave on S (see
Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004). Moreover σθ(s) is continuous on S.
Thus, a discounted Markov decision problem in stationary strategies can be
represented as a problem of maximization of quasi-monotonic function σθ(s) on a
polyhedron set S.
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We can present some similar results for an average Markov decision problem.
Let us consider an average Markov decision problem that is determined by the
tuple (X, {A(x)}x∈X , {rx,a}, p, θ). Lozovanu, D., 2018 showed that this decision
problem can be formulated and studied in terms of stationary strategies. In this
case the expected average reward ωθ(s) for a given stationary strategy s when
the starting state y ∈ X is chosen randomly according to probability distribution
















x,yqx = 0, ∀y ∈ X;







x,ywx = θy, ∀y ∈ X,
For the considered problem the following theorem has been proven.
















x,yqx = 0, ∀y ∈ X;







x,ywx = θy, ∀y ∈ X,
Then on the set S of the solutions of the system
∑
a∈A(x)
sx,a = 1, ∀x ∈ X;
sx,a ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A(x).
the function ωθ(s) depends only on sx,a for x ∈ X, a ∈ A(x) and σθ(s) is quasi-
monotonic on S (i.e. ωθ(s) is quasi-convex and quasi-concave on S).
So, an average Markov decision problem in stationary strategies can be rep-
resented as a problem of maximization of a quasi-monotonic function ωθ(s) on a
polyhedron set S. However, here, the function ωθ(s) on S may be discontinuous,
unless the fact that it is well dened on S.
The switching controller stochastic game models in stationary strategies with
discounted and average payos that we present in the next two sections contain
the game variants of the corresponding Markov decision problems in stationary
strategies formulated above.
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5. Determining Stationary Nash Equilibria for a Discounted Switching
Controller Stochastic Game
The existence of stationary Nash equilibria for discounted stochastic games with
nite state and action spaces has been proven by Fink, 1964 and Takahashi, 1964.
Based on a constructive proof of this result suitable algorithms for determining
stationary Nash equilibria for a discounted stochastic game has been elaborated
(see Kallenberg, 2016). Lozovanu and Pickl, 2018 proposed the following approach
for determining stationary equilibria in a discounted stochastic game with nite
state and action spaces.
Let (X, {Ai(x)}i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, p, γ, θ) be the tuple that determines a dis-
counted stochastic game where X is the nite set of states; Ai(x) is the set of
actions of player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} in the state x ∈ X; rix,a is the reward of player






i(x)×X → [0, 1] is the probability function that gives transi-
tion probabilities pax,y from an arbitrary x ∈ X to an arbitrary y ∈ X for each action
vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) in x; γ is a given discount factor and θ = {θy}y∈X is a
distribution function onX where θy expresses the probability that the game starts in
y. Lozovanu and Pickl, 2018 showed that all stationary equilibria for such a game
represents Nash equilibria of the following noncooperative static game in normal
form ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {σiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩, where each set of strategies Si, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
represents the set of solutions of the system
∑
ai∈Ai(x)
six,ai = 1, ∀x ∈ X;
six,ai ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A
i(x)
(4)
and each payo σix0(s
1, s2, . . . , sm)) is dened as follows
σiθ(s










i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(5)










x,y qx = θy, ∀y ∈ X; (6)
for an arbitrary s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sm, where Si represents
the set of solutions of system (4).
Each payo σix0(s
1, s2, . . . , sm)) in the considered auxiliary noncooperative game
possesses the properties that it is continuous on S and quasi-monotonic with respect
to the strategy si on Si. Therefore, based on results of Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986
the game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {σiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ has a Nash equilibrium and this equilibrium
is a stationary Nash equilibrium of the discounted stochastic game.
Taking into account that a discounted switching controller stochastic game repre-
sent a special case of a discounted stochastic game then we can specify the auxiliary
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game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {σiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ for a special case. So, if in (6) we take into account
that for each set Xi the transition probabilities in the states x ∈ Xi are controlled
only by player i then the payo σiθ(s) of player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} on S is dened as
follows
σiθ(s










i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(7)










x,y · qx = θy, ∀y ∈ X; (8)
for an arbitrary xed s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sm.
Each payo function σiθ(s
1, s2, . . . , sm) on S is continuous. Moreover, Lo-
zovanu and Pickl, 2018 showed that each payo σiθ(s
1, s2, . . . , sm) on S is
quasi-monotonic with respect to strategy si on Si. Therefore, based on the results
of Fan, 1966 and Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986 the following theorem holds.





, . . . , sm∗) ∈ S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sm that is a stationary Nash
equilibrium of the discounted switching controlled stochastic game determined by the
tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, p, γ, x0). Moreover this equilibrium is
a stationary Nash equilibrium of the discounted switching controller stochastic game
with an arbitrary starting state x ∈ X.
So, a stationary Nash equilibrium for a discounted switching controller stochas-
tic game determined by the tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}i=1,m, {rix,a}i = 1,m, p, γ, θ)
can be found by computing a Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative static game
⟨{Si}i=1,m, {σiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩, where the payos are determined according to (7),(8).
6. On Determining Stationary Nash Equilibria for an Average
Switching Controller Stochastic Game
In this section we show that if an average switching controller stochastic game
has a stationary Nash equilibrium then all such equilibria can be found from an aux-
iliary noncooperative static game in normal form ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ where
each payos ωiθ(s
1, s2, . . . , sm) are quasi-monotonic with respect to the correspond-
ing strategies of the players. To prove this we shall use the conditions obtained by
Lozovanu and Pickl, 2020 concerned with the existence of stationary Nash equilibria
for an average stochastic game with nite state and action spaces.
Let (X, {Ai(x)}i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, p, θ) be the tuple that determines an
average stochastic game where X is the nite set of states; Ai(x) is the set of
actions of player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} in the state x; rix,a is the reward of player
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} in the state x for an action vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) in x;





i(x)×X → [0, 1] is the probability function that gives tran-
sition probabilities pax,y from an arbitrary x ∈ X to an arbitrary y ∈ X for each
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action vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) in x and θ = {θy}y∈X is a distribution function
on X where θy expresses the probability that the average stochastic game starts
in y.
Lozovanu and Pickl, 2020 showed that if the average stochastic game determined
by the tuple (X, {Ai(x)}i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, p, θ) has stationary Nash equilibria
then for such a game an auxiliary noncooperative game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩
with quasi-monotonic payos ωiθ(s), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m on S = S
1 × S2×, . . . ,×Sm for
which Nash equilibria represents stationary Nash equilibria of the average stochas-
tic game can be constructed. The set of strategies Si of player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
represents the set of solutions of the system
∑
ai∈Ai(x)
six,ai = 1, ∀x ∈ X;
six,ai ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a
i ∈ Ai(x)
(9)
and each payo ωix0(s
1, s2, . . . , sm)) is dened as follows
ωiθ(s










i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(10)











x,y · qx = 0, ∀y ∈ X;









x,y · wx = θy, ∀y ∈ X,
(11)
for a xed strategy s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ S. In general, an average stochastic
game may have no stationary Nash equilibria (see Flesch et al., 1997) and then the
game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ has no Nash equilibrium. However if the game




, . . . , sm∗) then
this equilibrium is a stationary Nash equilibrium of the average switching stochastic
game for an arbitrary starting state y ∈ X (see Lozovanu and Pickl, 2020). In the
unichain case of the average stochastic game, when the matrix P s is unichain for










x,y · qx = 0, ∀y ∈ X;∑
x∈X qx = 1
(12)





, . . . , sm∗) that is a stationary Nash equilibrium of the average stochastic
game for an arbitrary starting state y ∈ X.
We can specify for an average switching controller game the auxiliary game
model ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ for the average stochastic game . If we specify the
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auxiliary noncooperative game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ for an average switching
controller stochastic game determined by the tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}x∈X,i=1,m,
{rix,a}i=1,m, p, θ) then we obtain the game where the sets of strategies Si,
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m represent the corresponding sets of solutions of the systems
∑
ai∈Ai(x)
six,ai = 1, ∀x ∈ X;















i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(14)











x,y · qx = 0, ∀y ∈ X;









x,y · wx = θy, ∀y ∈ X,
(15)
for a xed s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ S.
Based on the results bove we can formulate the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let be given an average switching controller stochastic game deter-
mined by the tuple ({Xi}i=1,m, {Ai(x)}x∈X,i=1,m, {rix,a}i=1,m, {pi}i=1,m, x0) and
let ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ be the auxiliary noncooperative static game with
quasi-monotonic payos ωiθ(s), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m for the average switching controller
stochastic game. Then the game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ has a Nash equilib-
rium if and only if the average switching controller game has a stationary Nash
equilibrium.
So, if an average switching controller stochastic game has stationary Nash equi-
libria then such equilibria can be found as Nash equilibria of the auxiliary nonco-
operative game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩, where Si and ωiθ(s), i = 1, 2. . . . ,m are
dened according to (13)-(15). In general, the problem of determining a Nash equi-
librium for the game ⟨{Si}i=1,m, {ωiθ(s)}i=1,m ⟩ may be a dicult problem because
the payos in the considered auxiliary game may be discontinuous with respect
to all strategies of the players. If the payps of the auxiliary game are continu-
ous or graph-continuous then according to Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986 we obtain
that the average switching controller stochastic game possesses a stationary Nash
equilibrium. An important class of average switching controller stochastic games
for which stationary Nash equilibria exist represents the average stochastic posi-
tional games (see Lozovanu, D., 2018) and single controller stochastic games (see
Rosenberg et al.,2004). For the unichain games the payos of the auxiliary game
are continuous and therefore in this case the average switching controller stochastic
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game possesses a stationary Nash equilibrtum. In this case the system (15) can be










x,y · qx = 0, ∀y ∈ X;∑
y∈X
qy = 1
and we obtain a more simple game model.
7. Conclusion
A discounted switching controller stochastic game always possesses stationary
Nash equilibria and all such equilibria can be found as Nash equilibria of the auxil-
iary noncooperative game with quasi-monotonic payos from Section 5. This aux-
iliary noncooperative game always has a Nash equilibrium because the payos are
quasi-monotonic with respect to the corresponding strategies of the players and
continuous with respect to all strategies of the players. For an average switching
controller stochastic game also can be considered an auxiliary noncooperative static
game with quasi-monotonic payos as it is shown in Section 6. However in this case
the payos may be not continuous with respect to all strategies of the players and
therefore the problem of determining a Nash equilibrium for the auxiliary static
game may be a dicult problem. If the payos in the auxiliary game are continu-
ous or graph-continuous in the sense of Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986 then the aver-
age switching controller stochastic game has a stationary Nash equilibrium. In the
unichain case an average switching controller stochastic game always has a station-
ary Nash equilibrium because the payos in the auxiliary static game are continuous
with respect to all strategies of the players. In general, the existence and determin-
ing stationary Nash equilibria for an average switching controller stochastic game
is a dicult open problem (see Thuijman and Raghavan, 1997, Flesch et al., 1997).
Nevertheless for an average switching controller stochastic game we can state that
the proposed auxiliary noncooperative static game from Section 6 has a Nash equi-
librium if and only if the average switching controller stochastic game has a station-
ary Nash equilibrium. An important class of average switching controller stochastic
games for which stationary Nash equilibria exist represents the average stochas-
tic positional games and single controller stochastic games. So, if we determine a
Nash equilibrium for the auxiliary static game then we determine a stationary Nash
equilibrium for the average switching controller stochastic game.
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